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Abstract. Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition forma-
tion, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each
agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition.
We prove that with additively separable preferences, it is Σp2 -complete
to decide whether a core- or strict-core-stable partition exists, extending
a result of Woeginger (2013). Our result holds even if valuations are sym-
metric and non-zero only for a constant number of other agents. We also
establish Σp2 -completeness of deciding non-emptiness of the strict core for
hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Such results establish that
the core is much less tractable than solution concepts such as individual
stability.
1 Introduction
Suppose agents wish to form coalitions, perhaps to jointly achieve some task
or common goal, with the payoff to an agent depending on the make-up of the
coalition the agent is joining. In many situations, it makes sense to model agents’
preferences to only depend on the identity of the players in a group. Such games
are called hedonic games, because agents in a hedonic game can be seen as
deriving pleasure from each other’s presence.
An agent in a hedonic game specifies a preference ordering over all sets (coali-
tions) of agents. An outcome of the game is a partition of the agent set into
disjoint coalitions. A player prefers those partitions in which she is part of a pre-
ferred coalition. The main focus of the literature on hedonic games is studying
outcomes that are stable [7,9].
Of the many notions of stability discussed in the literature, the most promi-
nent is the concept of the core. A partition π of the agent set is core-stable if
there is no non-empty set S of agents all of which strictly prefer S to where
they are in π. Intuitively, if the state of affairs were π, then the members of S
would find each other and decide to defect together because π does not offer
them enough utility. In this case, we say that S blocks π. A related concept is
the strict core. The partition π is strict-core-stable if there is no set S of agents
all of which weakly prefer S to π, but with at least one agent i in S having a
strict preference in favour of S. Intuitively, i can offer some of his profit of the
deviation to the other players, inducing S to deviate from π; and even if utility
is entirely non-transferable, the players who are indifferent between π and S will
be easily convinced to join the deviation.
Computationally speaking, hedonic games are large objects: every player is
described by a preference ordering over exponentially many sets. However, there
are attractive concise representations of such preferences, many of which have
been studied in the computer science literature [6,10,12,22,3]. Given a concise
representation (which usually is not universally expressive), it makes sense to
pose the computational problem of finding a stable outcome given a hedonic
game. Since many games do not admit stable outcomes, we can conveniently
consider the decision problem whether one exists. This problem turns out to be
NP-hard for most cases (see Peters and Elkind [18] for a systematic study of
representations inducing NP-hard core-existence problems, and Woeginger
[23] for a survey). In particular, the case of additively separable hedonic games
is an example of a class of succinctly represented hedonic games where it is hard
to distinguish games admitting stable outcomes from those which do not [22,2].
In this model, agents assign numeric values vi(j) to other players, and the utility
of a coalition is the sum
∑
j∈S vi(j) of the values of the players in it.
In general, core-existence, the problem of deciding whether a given hedo-
nic game admits a core-stable partition, is contained in the complexity class Σp2 .
This is because the question under consideration is characterised by a single alter-
nation of quantifiers: “does there exist a partition π such that for all coalitions
S, S does not block π?”. Here, we have assumed to be able to efficiently decide
whether a given coalition S blocks, which is trivially the case for all commonly
considered representations. Alternatively, since Σp2 = NP
NP, we can see contain-
ment of core-existence through the following non-deterministic algorithm:
guess a partition π, and use the NP-oracle to check whether π is core-stable.
In the case of additively separable games, it is coNP-complete to verify that a
given partition π is core-stable [11]. Thus, it is unlikely that the core-existence
problem is contained in NP. Indeed, Woeginger [24] proved that the problem is
Σp2 -complete. The problem thus encapsulates the full hardness of the second
level of the polynomial hierarchy, making it much harder to decide than NP-
complete problems. (Woeginger likens NP-complete problems to “rotten eggs”
while Σp2 -complete problems are at the level of “radioactive thallium”.)
Recent decades have shown impressive advances in general-purpose tools to
handle NP-complete problems, such as through SAT and ILP solvers. Thus,
for solution concepts such as Nash stability, whose existence problem is NP-
complete, we should expect tractability in many practically relevant cases. On
the other hand, because of Σp2 -hardness, finding a core-stable partition will likely
require exponentially many calls to solvers. This suggests that the core will
remain computationally elusive for some time to come.
In this paper, we extend Woeginger’s result to the strict core. In addition, our
reduction—which works for both the core and the strict core—produces additive
hedonic games that are symmetric and sparse, showing that imposing these addi-
tional restrictions do not lead to a drop in complexity. Before we turn to additive
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games, however, we first consider hedonic games with dichotomous preferences,
or Boolean hedonic games [4]. In these games, players only distinguish between
approved and non-approved coalitions. Preferences in these games can be spec-
ified by giving each agent a goal formula of propositional logic; the approved
coalitions are those which satisfy the goal. We show that deciding the existence
of a strict-core-stable outcome in a Boolean hedonic game is Σp2 -complete. For
the framework of Aziz et al. [4], this is interesting because it suggests that no
polynomial-sized formula in their logic will be able to characterize strict-core-
stable outcomes. Our hardness result for additive games is then obtained by
implementing the reduction for the dichotomous case using additive valuations.
2 Preliminaries
Given a finite set of agents N , a hedonic game is a pair G = 〈N, (<i)i∈N 〉, where
each agent i ∈ N possesses a complete and transitive preference relation <i over
Ni = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S}, the set of coalitions containing i. If S <i T , we say that
i weakly prefers S to T . If S <i T but T 6<i S, we say that the preference is
strict and write S ≻i T . An agent is indifferent between S and T whenever both
S <i T and T <i S.
An outcome of a hedonic game is a partition π of N into disjoint coalitions.
We write π(i) for the coalition of π that contains i. If π(i) <i {i} for each i ∈ N ,
then π is individually rational. We say that a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N blocks π
if S ≻i π(i) for all i ∈ S. Thus, all members of a blocking coalition strictly prefer
that coalition to where they are in π. The partition π is core-stable if there is
no blocking coalition. A non-empty coalition S ⊆ N weakly blocks π if S <i π(i)
for all i ∈ S, and S ≻i π(i) for some i ∈ S. The partition π is strict-core-stable
if there is no weakly blocking coalition. Clearly, if π is strict-core-stable, then it
is also core-stable. There are many other stability concepts for hedonic games
that we do not consider here, see Aziz and Savani [5] for a survey.
A hedonic game has dichotomous preferences, and is called a Boolean hedonic
game, if for each agent i ∈ N the coalitions Ni = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S} can
be partitioned into approved coalitions N+i and non-approved coalitions N
−
i
such that i strictly prefers approved coalitions to non-approved coalitions, but
is indifferent within the two groups: so S ≻i T iff S ∈ N
+
i and T ∈ N
−
i . We can
specify a Boolean hedonic game by assigning to each agent i ∈ N a formula φi
(i’s goal) of propositional logic with the propositional atoms given by the agent
set N . A coalition S ∋ i is then approved by i if and only if S |= φi, that is
the formula φi is satisfied by the truth assignment that sets variable j ∈ N true
iff j ∈ S. For example, if i’s goal formula φi is (j ∨ k) ∧ ¬ℓ, then i approves
coalitions containing agent j or k as long as they do not contain agent ℓ.
A hedonic game is additively separable, and is called an additive hedonic
game, if there are valuation functions vi : N → Z for each agent i ∈ N such that
S <i T if and only if
∑
j∈S vi(j) >
∑
j∈T vi(j). An additive hedonic game is
symmetric if vi(j) = vj(i) for all i, j ∈ N .
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The complexity class Σp2 , the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, is
NPNP, the class of problems solvable by a polynomial-time non-deterministic
Turing machine when given an NP-oracle. It can also be seen as the class of
problems polynomial-time reducible to the language TRUE ∃∀-QBF, which con-
sists of true quantified Boolean formulas with only 1 alternation of quantifiers.
3 Related Work
Boolean hedonic games were introduced by Aziz et al. [4] who study them from
a mainly logical point of view. (Notice that they use a different choice of propo-
sitional atoms—pairs of agents—to allow future generalisations to games played
on general coalition structures. Our choice is more natural for the hedonic set-
ting.) In particular, Aziz et al. [4] show that every Boolean hedonic game admits
a core-stable partition. Thus, only the complexity of the existence of the strict
core needs to be settled. Peters [16] shows that finding a core-stable partition,
while it is guaranteed to exist, is FNP-hard.
Elkind and Wooldridge [12] introduce a representation formalism for hedonic
games called hedonic coalition nets (HC-nets), which can be seen as a powerful
mixture of the additive and Boolean representations introduced above. Here,
agents provide several goals φi weighted by real numbers, and an agent obtains
as utility the sum of the weights of the formulas that are satisfied by the coalition.
Thus, additively separable games are given by HC-nets in which every formula
is just a single positive literal, and Boolean hedonic games are given by HC-nets
in which every agent has only a single formula. It follows from a general result of
Malizia et al. [14] that core-existence is Σp2 -complete to decide for games given
by HC-nets (see also Elkind and Wooldridge [12]). We strengthen this to also
apply to the strict core, and to hold even if either every agent only has a single
formula, or if every formula is given by a single literal.
This paper follows the work of Woeginger [24] who proves that deciding core-
existence is Σp2 -complete for additive hedonic games. His reduction (from the
same problem that we reduce from) does not work for the strict core, and in
his survey [23] he poses the problem to establish Σp2 -hardness for this solution
concept. Doing this is the main contribution of this paper. We also strengthen
Woeginger’s [24] result for the core to hold even for symmetric valuations, and
even if vi(j) is non-zero for at most 10 agents j, so that the game is “sparse”.
This closes off two avenues for potential avoidance of Σp2 -hardness.
Since a preprint of this paper appeared on arXiv, some additionalΣp2 -hardness
results for hedonic games have been obtained. Ohta et al. [15] show that in he-
donic games based on aversion to enemies (introduced by Dimitrov et al. [11]),
if one allows ‘neutral’ players, then deciding the existence of the (strict) core
is Σp2 -hard. The games studied by Ohta et al. [15] are in fact additively sep-
arable; thus, they imply Σp2 -hardness of the (strict) core in additive hedonic
games. Hardness holds even if we restrict players’ valuations to take at most
three values, so that vi(j) ∈ {−n, 0, 1} for all i, j ∈ N . However, in contrast
to our reduction, the games produced in their reduction are not symmetric and
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not sparse. Ohta et al. [15] also show Σp2 -hardness for the strict core for games
based on friend appreciation in the presence of neutral players. Aziz et al. [1]
consider fractional hedonic games, where players care about the average value
of their coalition partners, rather than the sum. They show that deciding the
existence of the core is Σp2 -hard, even if valuations are symmetric and simple, so
that vi(j) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j ∈ N . The reductions in both of these recent papers
is from the complement of the minmax clique problem [13], which seems to be
well-suited as a starting point for reductions for hedonic games. In this paper,
like in Woeginger [24], we instead use a problem based on quantified Boolean
formulas.
Peters [17] introduces graphical hedonic games, which are hedonic games
equipped with an underlying graph on the agent set. This is a direct analogue of
non-cooperative graphical games. In this language, our result for additive hedonic
games implies that deciding the existence of the (strict) core is Σp2 -hard even for
graphical hedonic games of bounded degree—that is, games whose underlying
graph has a max-degree of at most 10.
4 A Useful Restricted Hard Problem
Stockmeyer [21] proved that the following basic problem is Σp2 -complete:
TRUE ∃∀-3DNF
Instance: A quantified Boolean formula of form
∃x1, . . . , xm ∀y1, . . . , yn φ(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn),
where φ is in disjunctive normal form with each disjunct containing 2 or 3 literals.
Question: Is the formula true?
Here we show that the problem remains Σp2 -complete even if we place restrictions
on the number of occurrences of the variables, like is standard practice when
proving NP-completeness.
RESTRICTED TRUE ∃∀-3DNF
Instance: A quantified Boolean formula of form
∃x1, . . . , xm∀y1, . . . , yn φ(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn),
where φ is in disjunctive normal form with
– each disjunct containing 2 or 3 literals,
– each x-variable occurring exactly once positive and once negative
– each y-variable occurring exactly three times, and at least once positively
and at least once negatively.
Question: Is the formula true?
We may further insist that every disjunct contain at most 2 x-literals, because
a disjunct containing only x-literals makes the formula trivially true.
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Proposition 1. The problem RESTRICTED TRUE ∃∀-3DNF is Σp2 -complete.
Proof. Membership in Σp2 is clear.
Let us note that a true ∃∀-3dnf-formula is the same thing as a false ∀∃-
3cnf-formula; we will use this latter view since CNF formulas are more familiar.
Thus, we may reduce from the unrestricted problem false-∀∃-3cnf. We will in
polynomial time transform a given such formula
∀x1, . . . , xm∃y1, . . . , yn φ(x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn)
into a formula of equal truth value which is restricted as above, establishing
hardness of the restricted variant.
First, by unit propagation, we may assume that no clause contains only a sin-
gle literal. Next, for each x-variable xi, relabel all its occurrences as y
1
i , . . . , y
ni
i
where ni is the number of occurrences of xi, and the y
r
i are new variables. Ex-
istentially quantify over these new variables, keeping xi universally quantified.
Add clauses (xi → y1i )∧(y
1
i → y
2
i )∧· · ·∧(y
ni
i → xi) to force all copies to have the
same truth value. Similarly, for each old y-variable, we relabel all its occurrences
(existentially quantifying) and add a ‘wheel of implications’ for them as well
(here we may discard the old y-variable in the process). The resulting formula
satisfies the restrictions and has the same truth value as the original formula.
⊓⊔
By using the techniques of Berman et al. [8], we can similarly prove that
the problem remains Σp2 -complete if disjuncts are required to contain exactly
3 distinct literals, each x-literal occurs exactly once, and each y-literal occurs
exactly twice. One can also show that the problem remains Σp2 -complete if every
clause contains at most one x-literal [13, Theorem 10]. For the reductions in this
paper, we do not need these other restrictions.
5 Strict Core for Boolean Hedonic Games
Our first hardness result concerns Boolean hedonic games, as introduced by Aziz
et al. [4]. While for this type of hedonic game, the core is always guaranteed to
exist, the strict core is more difficult to handle.
Theorem 1. The problem “does a given Boolean hedonic game admit a strict-
core-stable partition?” is Σp2 -complete.
Proof. Membership inΣp2 is clear, since we are asking: does there exist a partition
such that for all coalitions S, S does not block?
For hardness, we reduce from RESTRICTED TRUE ∃∀-3DNF. Let ϕ =
∃x∀yφ be an instance of this problem, where x = (xi) and y = (yj) denote vec-
tors of variables. We rewrite ϕ as ∃x(¬∃y¬φ). Note that ¬φ is a 3CNF formula,
and when below we talk about clauses, we are always referring to clauses of ¬φ.
In the hedonic game which we construct below, a strict-core-stable partition cor-
responds to an assignment to the x-variables. If there is a y-assignment satisfying
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¬φ (so that ϕ is false), this will form a weakly blocking coalition, and conversely,
such a coalition induces a satisfying assignment. If the formula is true, such a
blocking coalition cannot exist.
For our construction, we take the following agents:
– For each xi, four agents xi, xi, ti, fi.
– For each yj , two agents yj, yj .
– For each clause ck in ¬φ, one agent ck.
– A single player ϕ representing the formula.
We now specify agents’ goals. For a clause ck of ¬φ, we let ℓk1 , ℓ
k
2 , ℓ
k
3 denote the
agents corresponding to the literals occurring in it. For example, if clause ck is
(x1 ∨ ¬y2 ∨ y3), then ℓk1 refers to agent x1, ℓ
k
2 refers to y2, and ℓ
k
3 refers to y3. If
a clause only contains 2 literals, just let ℓk2 = ℓ
k
3 .
– xi : fi ∧ ¬ti ∧ xi
– xi : ti ∧ ¬fi ∧ xi
– ti : ¬ϕ
– fi : ¬ϕ
– yj : ¬yj
– yj : ¬yj
– ck : ¬ϕ ∨ ((ℓk1 ∨ ℓ
k
2 ∨ ℓ
k
3) ∧ ck+1), or
ck : ¬ϕ ∨ (ℓk1 ∨ ℓ
k
2 ∨ ℓ
k
3) if ck+1 does not exist
– ϕ : c1 ∧ (x1 ∨ x1)
This hedonic game has a strict-core-stable outcome if and only if ϕ is true.
⇐= : Suppose ϕ is true. Take an assignment A to the x-variables certifying
truth of ϕ. Then take the partition π with coalitions {ti, xi, xi} for true xi, with
coalitions {fi, xi, xi} for false xi, and singleton coalitions for all other players.
We show that π is strict-core-stable.
Most agents’ goals are satisfied in π, except for true x-literals and the player
ϕ. If π is not stable, then there is a weakly blocking coalition S including a
player whose goal is satisfied in S but not in π; also, no other player in S can be
worse off in S than in π. Now the profiting player cannot be a true x-literal, for
if this player were to gain then its complementary literal must be part of S and
this literal would lose, because complementary literals have incompatible goals.
Hence any weakly blocking coalition S must include the ϕ-player and must satisfy
it. Looking at ϕ’s goal, this means that c1 ∈ S. Indeed, by induction, ck ∈ S for
all ck, since ck ∈ S cannot be worse off in S, and thus ck’s goal must be satisfied,
which requires ck+1 ∈ S.
Since every ck is satisfied in π, the goal of every ck is also satisfied in S. This
means that the literals present in S must satisfy each clause of ¬φ. Thus, the
literals present in S satisfy ¬φ. This contradicts truth of ϕ under the assignment
A once we can show that S does not contain complementary y-literals, and only
contains x-literals that are true in A. But both of these requirements are easy
to see: since all y-literals have their goal satisfied in π, they must have their goal
satisfied in S, which means their complementary literal is not part of S. Also, a
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false x-literal is happy in π but would be unhappy in S since ti, fi 6∈ S (because
they hate ϕ), and thus false x-literals are not part of the weakly blocking S.
Hence π is strict-core-stable.
=⇒ : Suppose the game has a strict-core-stable outcome π. We show that ϕ
is true. First we will find an appropriate assignment to the x-variables. Fix some
variable xi. Since the goals of xi and xi are incompatible, at most one of them is
happy in π. If both are unhappy, then {ti, xi, xi} weakly blocks. Hence for each
xi, exactly one of xi and xi has their goal satisfied. Define the assignment that
sets that literal true which is not satisfied.
Soon we will need to know that the ϕ player does not have its goal satisfied
in π. For a contradiction suppose it does. Then x1 ∈ π(ϕ) or x1 ∈ π(ϕ). Since x1
or x1 has their goal satisfied in π, both of them are together with either t1 or f1.
So either t1 ∈ π(ϕ) or f1 ∈ π(ϕ); but then {t1} or {f1} blocks π, a contradiction.
Now take an arbitrary assignment to the y-variables, and suppose for a con-
tradiction that under these assignments to the x- and y-variables the formula
φ becomes false, so that ¬φ becomes true so every clause is true. Let S be the
coalition consisting of player ϕ, all clauses ck, all true x-literals, and all true y-
literals. In S, every player except for the true x-literals is satisfied, so no player
is worse off. However ϕ did not have its goal satisfied in π, so is strictly better
off in S, and hence S weakly blocks π, a contradiction. Thus, ϕ must be true.
⊓⊔
Hardness holds even if every agent mentions at most 5 other agents in their goal.
By rewriting the formulas, we can see that hardness also holds even if goals are
given in 3-DNF or 4-CNF.
6 Core and Strict Core for Additive Hedonic Games
The structure of our reduction for Boolean hedonic games can be adapted to work
in the additive case. The resulting reduction is necessarily less straightforward,
because we have to simulate the clausal structure using additive valuations. On
the other hand, the resulting reduction works for both the core and the strict
core. Further, this is the first hardness reduction for additive hedonic games that
applies even to “sparse” games, where players assign non-zero valuations to only
at most a fixed number of other players.
Theorem 2. The problem “does a given additive hedonic game admit a strict-
core-stable partition?” is Σp2 -complete. The same question for the core is also
Σp2 -complete, and both problems remain hard even for symmetric utilities that
only assign non-zero values to at most 10 other players.
Proof. Membership inΣp2 is clear, since we are asking: does there exist a partition
such that for all coalitions S, S does not block?
For hardness, we reduce from RESTRICTED TRUE ∃∀-3DNF. Let ϕ =
∃x∀yφ be an instance of this problem, where x = (xi) and y = (yj) denote vec-
tors of variables. We rewrite ϕ as ∃x(¬∃y¬φ). Note that ¬φ is a 3CNF formula,
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  ···
c1 13
5 5 5
c2 13
5 5 5
c3
5 5 5
· · · cm
5 5 5
···
? _
c′1
30
c′2
30
c′3
30
· · · c′m
30
Fig. 1. The clause gadgets. Clauses are arranged in a cycle. We will consider a partition
π where each clause agent ck is in a pair with its helper c
′
k. If the formula is false,
though, all the clauses join forces and can deviate together with a falsifying selection
of y-literals (and of true x-literals).
and when below we talk about clauses, we are always referring to clauses of ¬φ.
In the hedonic game which we construct below, a (strict-)core-stable partition
corresponds to an assignment to the x-variables. If there is a y-assignment sat-
isfying ¬φ, this will form a blocking coalition, and conversely, such a coalition
induces a satisfying assignment. If the formula ϕ is true under the assignment
to the x-variables, such a blocking coalition cannot exist.
Before we start, let us add a new x-variable (call it x∗) to the formula and
add the clause c1 := (x∗ ∨ x∗) to ¬φ. This preserves the truth value of the
formula, and preserves the restrictions of the input problem. This will help in
the proof of implication (iii) ⇒ (i) later.
We take the following agents:
– For each xi, four agents xi, xi, ti, fi.
– For each yj , two agents yj, yj .
– For each clause ck in ¬φ, one agent ck.
– A helper player c′k for each ck, and helper players t
′
i and f
′
i for each ti and
fi.
We say that a player p who has a helper player p′ is supported. The purpose of
the helper players will be to guarantee that supported players obtain utility at
least 30 in stable outcomes.
In Table 1, we specify agents’ symmetric utilities, see also Figures 1 and 2.
All utilities not specified in the table are 0; the figures also omit −∞ valuations
for clarity. As notation, for a literal ℓ, we let c(ℓ) denote the clauses that contain
ℓ; for x-literals there is just one such clause, but there are up to two for y-
literals. We also let ℓ(c) denote the literals occurring in c. We take arithmetic in
subscripts of clause names (as in ‘ck+1’) to be modulo the number of clauses in
¬φ.
We show that the following are equivalent:
(i) The input formula is true.
(ii) The game admits a strict-core-stable partition.
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a b va(b)
xi xi −10
fi 20
ti 14
c(xi) 5
f ′i −∞
t′i −∞
c′(xi) −∞
ti xi 14
xi 20
t′i 30
fi −∞
c(xi) −∞
a b va(b)
xi xi −10
fi 14
ti 20
c(xi) 5
f ′i −∞
t′i −∞
c′(xi) −∞
fi xi 20
xi 14
f ′i 30
ti −∞
c(xi) −∞
a b va(b)
yj yj −∞
c(yj) 5
c′(yj) −∞
ck ck−1 13
ck+1 13
ℓ(c) 5
c′k 30
ti/fi −∞
c′k−1 −∞
c′k+1 −∞
a b va(b)
yj yj −∞
c(yj) 5
c′(yj) −∞
c′k ck 30
ℓ(ck) −∞
ck−1 −∞
ck+1 −∞
t′i ti 30
xi, xi −∞
f ′i fi 30
xi, xi −∞
Table 1. The agent valuations va(b). All values not specified are 0. The value “−∞”
denotes any sufficiently large negative number; −100 will do. Notice that the valuations
are symmetric (va(b) = vb(a)) and every agent specifies at most 10 non-zero values,
noting that we can ensure that no clause contains more than 2 x-literals.
(iii) The game admits a core-stable partition.
Call a coalition S feasible if it is individually rational (and in particular does
not contain players who evaluate each other as −∞), and if each ‘supported’
player (those that have a helper player: ck/ti/fi) obtains utility > 30 in S. Call
a coalition infeasible otherwise. Observe that all coalitions in a core-stable par-
tition must be feasible (as otherwise it is not individually rational or a coalition
like {ck, c′k} blocks). Observe further that if a partition π is weakly blocked by
some coalition S, then it is weakly blocked by a feasible coalition. This is because
if S is not individually rational for player i, then π is also weakly blocked by the
feasible coalition {i} or {i, i′}, and if S gives less than utility 30 to a supported
player i, then the feasible coalition {i, i′} also weakly blocks π. These properties
of feasible coalitions formalise the intuitive purpose of the helper players: they
guarantee a minimum payoff to the supported player in any stable outcome.
Lemma. In a feasible coalition S ∋ ck, either
(a) c′k ∈ S but ck−1, ck+1, ℓ(ck) 6∈ S, or
(b) S contains all clause players simultaneously, and for each clause, some literal
occurring in it is part of S.
Proof. Note that c′k hates all other players to which ck assigns positive utility
(namely ck−1, ck+1, ℓ(ck)), so that if c
′
k ∈ S then those players cannot be in S. So
suppose c′k 6∈ S. We will prove by induction that we are in case (b). By feasibility
of S, ck obtains utility at least 30. This is only possible if both ck−1 ∈ S and
ck+1 ∈ S (subscripts mod the number of clauses), since the literals connected
to ck only give total utility 3 · 5 = 15. Thus, ck+1 ∈ S. Assume now that
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t′i
30
ti
14
⑤⑤
⑤
⑤⑤
⑤
20
❇❇
❇
❇❇
c(xi) xi5 −10 xi 5 c(xi)
fi
14
⑤⑤⑤
⑤⑤⑤
20❇❇❇
❇❇❇
f ′i
30
Fig. 2. The x-variable gadget. If the variable is set true, the upper triangle forms a
coalition. If it is false, the lower triangle forms a coalition. Note that in this configura-
tion, the true (but not the false) literal is willing to deviate with the connected clause
agent.
ck, ck+1, . . . , cs−1, cs ∈ S for some s. As cs−1 and c′s hate each other, we have
c′s 6∈ S. But feasibility for cs then implies that cs+1 ∈ S. By induction, all clause
players are in S. Finally, if some clause player did not have any of its literals in
S, then it would only obtain utility 26 in S contradicting feasibility. ⊓⊔
Let us note that in case (b), some x-literal must be part of S; namely at least
one x∗-literal by feasibility for c1.
(i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose the input formula is true. Take an assignment A of the x-
variables certifying truth of the formula. Then take the partition π with coalitions
{ti, xi, xi}, {t′i}, {fi, f
′
i} for true xi, with coalitions {fi, xi, xi}, {f
′
i}, {ti, t
′
i} for
false xi, with coalitions {ck, c′k} for each ck, and singleton coalitions {yj}, {yj}
for y-literals. We show that π is strict-core-stable.
Suppose not, and there is a weakly blocking coalition S which we may assume
to be feasible. In π, the following players are already in a best coalition among
feasible ones: false x-literals (with utility 10), ti and fi players together with
literals (with utility 34), c′k (with utility 30), and paired t
′
i, f
′
i (with utility 30).
Since S is weakly blocking, it contains a player p who strictly prefers S to π.
This p cannot be on the preceding list.
Now p also cannot be a ti or fi player together with its helper for it cannot
offer its associated literals a feasible coalition as good as they have in π (namely,
the false literal involved would move from utility 10 to 4). Also, p cannot be
a singleton t′i or f
′
i as ti or fi (currently with utility 34) will be less happy in
feasible coalitions together with t′i or f
′
i (which only offers 30). Hence, p is either
a true x-literal, a y-literal, or a ck player. In the former two cases, in order that
p strictly gains utility, S must also include a clause player associated with the
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literal p. So in either case S includes a clause player, and by the lemma, since
we cannot be in case (a), S must contain all clause players, and enough literals
to satisfy every clause. This means that the literals present in S satisfy ¬φ. This
contradicts truth of ϕ under assignment A once we can show that the literals
in S form a valid assignment, i.e., S does not contain complementary y-literals,
and only contains true x-literals. But both of these requirements are easy to see:
by feasibility of S no y-literal has their complementary literal in S (since they
hate each other). Also, a false x-literal (currently with utility 10) would be worse
off in S since ti, fi 6∈ S (by feasibility since ti, fi hate a clause) and so the false
x-literal would obtain at most 5 in S. Thus, false x-literals are not part of the
weakly blocking S. Hence π is strict-core-stable.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Strict-core-stability implies core-stability.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Suppose the game has a core-stable outcome π. We show that the
formula is true. Recall that every coalition in π must be feasible. Write i ∼ j
for agents i, j that appear in the same coalition in π (so ∼ is the equivalence
relation associated with π).
First we will find an appropriate assignment for the x-variables. Consider
variable xi. It cannot be that both xi ∼ c(xi) and xi ∼ c(xi) for then by the
lemma all clause players are together in π, which implies xi 6∼ ti, fi (since they
hate a clause) and so xi obtains utility at most 5 − 10 = −5, contradicting
feasibility. If exactly one of xi and xi is together with clause players, say xi ∼
c(xi), then xi must obtain utility 0, because feasibility for fi and ti implies
that they obtain utility at least 30, which they can only obtain if they are either
together with both xi and xi (but this is impossible because xi 6∼ xi by the lemma
and our assumption that xi 6∼ c(xi)) or if they are together with their helper
player but not with either xi or xi. Thus {xi, xi, fi} blocks, a contradiction. The
only remaining possibility is that both xi 6∼ c(xi) and xi 6∼ c(xi). In this case,
we can see that core-stability implies either xi ∼ xi ∼ ti or xi ∼ xi ∼ fi but
not both: having both is infeasible because ti and fi hate each other; having
neither is unstable because {xi, xi, fi} would block. Define the assignment that
sets those variables xi true for which xi ∼ ti, and sets those variables xi false
for which xi ∼ fi.
Soon we will need to know that π makes most players not very happy. Indeed,
we claim that in π, clause players ck obtain utility 30, and y-literals obtain
utility 0. This is because if any two of these players would obtain strictly more
in π, then case (b) of the lemma applies, so that all clause players are together in
π, and they are together with literals which include an x∗-literal. But we already
know that x-literals are not together with their clause player, a contradiction.
Now take an arbitrary assignment to the y-variables, and suppose for a con-
tradiction that under these assignments to the x- and y-variables the formula ϕ
becomes false, so that ¬φ becomes true meaning each clause of ¬φ is true. Let
S be the coalition consisting of all clauses ck, all true x-literals, and all true y-
literals. In S, true x-literals obtain utility 5 > 4, y-literals obtain positive utility,
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and clauses obtain utility > 31 = 13 + 13 + 5. Hence everyone in S is strictly
better off in S than in π. Thus π is not core-stable, contradiction. Thus, ϕ must
be true. ⊓⊔
7 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown that deciding the existence of a core- or strict-core-stable parti-
tion in a given additive hedonic game is Σp2 -complete, and similarly that decid-
ing the existence of a strict-core-stable partition in a Boolean hedonic game is
Σp2 -complete. This answers the complexity status of these questions conclusively,
and implies that solving them is even harder than solving NP-complete problems
(unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).
The root cause for Σp2 -hardness is that blocking coalitions may be very large.
If we consider a solution concept according to which only coalitions of bounded
size may block, the existence problem is contained in NP. If the size bound is 2,
the problem is identical to the stable roommates setting, and in some cases there
are known tractability results. For larger size bounds, it is likely that hardness
holds. It would be interesting to further explore this variation of the concept of
the core.
Our reduction for additive games produced a hardness result that holds even
for sparse game that have maximum degree bounded by 10. It would be inter-
esting to decide the complexity of cases where other parameters are small. For
example, Ohta et al. [15] show that the core remains Σp2 -hard even if agents only
assign three different valuation numbers to the other players. Another parameter
that may be interesting is the number of agent types, that is, the number of dif-
ferent valuation functions appearing in the game (see, e.g., Shrot et al. [20]). In
the framework of graphical hedonic games [17], it would be interesting to decide
the complexity of cases where the underlying graph is planar, or bipartite, or
satisfying some other topological constraint. Looking in another direction, our
hardness result appears to be the first that applies to sparse games, i.e., games
in which agents only assign non-zero valuations to at most a constant number
of other agents. It would be interesting to see whether deciding the existence of
other solution concepts, such as Nash or individually stable partitions, remains
hard for sparse games. More technically, it is likely possible to improve our bound
of 10 to a smaller maximum degree.
We also reiterate here a problem posed by Woeginger [23]: is strict-core-
existence Σp2 -hard even for games based on aversion to enemies? These are addi-
tive hedonic games in which vi(j) ∈ {−∞, 1} for all agents i, j ∈ N . It appears
that an entirely different approach is necessary for this setting. Partial progress
on this problem is presented by Rey et al. [19] and by Ohta et al. [15].
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